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Have you ever watched a poker game where the winner walks
away with ninety billion dollars? The World Series of Poker, which
awards prizes ranging from five to eight million dollars1 to the
winner of the main event, cannot compete with the risk taking
that was recently on display at the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. A hedge fund tried to collect the full value
on Argentinian bonds that it had purchased at a significant
discount while simultaneously bringing the international bond
market to its knees. The legal question that the Second Circuit
* Irakli Shalolashvili received his B.A. in 2006 and his M.A. in 2008 from the
Rabbinical Seminary of America, and he will be graduating Magna Cum Laude from
the University of Miami School of Law in May 2015. Eric was the Student Writing
Editor for the Inter-American Law Review from 2014-2015.
1. The winner of the 2013 Annual World Series of Poker was awarded
$8,361,570.00. Final Results of Event #62: No-Limit Hold’em Main Event, WORLD
SERIES OF POKER, http://www.wsop.com/tournaments/results.asp?grid=968&tid=128
61 (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
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faced was one of simple contract interpretation. The Court’s
decision was so controversial, however, that countries, like
France, had no choice but to publicly criticize the ruling and file
amicus briefs on behalf of Argentina with the Supreme Court of
the United States.2  The ruling was met with such criticism
because the Second Circuit interpreted the clause in question in
contrast to how courts had been interpreting it for decades. As a
result, the international bond markets suffered. Had the court
given more weight to market forces and the principles of efficiency
maximization, it would have reached a different result.
I. BACKGROUND
On December 26, 2001, Argentina defaulted on more than 94
billion dollars in sovereign debt by not paying the interest on its
outstanding bonds.3 The country was in a political crisis, having
elected its third president in four days,4 largely due to the finan-
cial turmoil created by the massive debt owed to the bondholders.
Adolfo Saa, the country’s new President, said, “Argentines
demand change . . . today we accept that challenge.”5 Part of the
change that President Saa referred to was Argentina’s decision to
default on the bonds, which freed up capital that his government
desperately needed for domestic spending. Argentina’s default
was the largest default in history.6 After the country defaulted, it
asked the bondholders to renegotiate the terms of the bonds.7
The renegotiation of bonds, especially 94 billion dollars’
worth, is an inherently high-risk undertaking. The bond issuer’s
objective is to pay as little as possible on each dollar owed while at
the same time getting all of the bondholders to agree on the settle-
ment. The bondholder’s objective is to minimize their losses and
get as much as possible out of the bond issuer. In 2005, during the
first restructuring, the Argentinian government settled with the
2. See Anna Gelpern, France is Man Enough to Pari Passu, CREDIT SLIPS (July
27, 2013, 7:59 AM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2013/07/france-is-man-
enough-to-pari-passu.html.
3. Sophie Arie & Andrew Cave, Argentina Makes Biggest Debt Default in History,





7. See generally J.F. Hornbeck, Argentina’s Defaulted Sovereign Debt: Dealing
with the “Holdouts” 1, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/row/R41029.pdf.
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affected bondholders for a fraction of the money owed.8 For two-
thirds of the bondholders, the settlement provided for a 27-30%
recovery rate of the original debt.9,10  The remaining third contin-
ued to hold bonds that were in default.
In 2010, the Argentinian government entered into negotia-
tions with most of the remaining holdout bondholders.11 The bond-
holders were threatening to seize Argentinian assets abroad and
obtain an injunction to stop the government from paying the set-
tled bonds and defaulting on the holdouts.12 The negotiations led
to another settlement, bringing the total percentage of bondhold-
ers that settled to over ninety percent.13 The remaining bondhold-
ers who did not accept the 2010 settlement are known as the
vulture funds.
Vulture funds have one goal: collect 100 percent of the money
owed—not pennies on the dollar.14 Though the vulture funds
turned to the judicial system for relief, suing a sovereign in federal
court is very complicated. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(“FSIA”)15 generally shields governments from being sued in the
United States. A notable exception to FSIA exists when the for-
eign state has waived its immunity.16
Although the jurisdictional question is a fascinating one, it is
not the main focus of this paper. Even if the vulture funds got into
federal court, winning was not a certainty. To win, the funds had
to convince the court of its interpretation of the central clause in
the bond agreement between Argentina and the bondholders.17
The clause in question is the pari passu clause. The vulture funds
succeeded in convincing the court that the question was a narrow
8. Id. at 5.
9. Id.
10. Who the bondholders are is an important question that will be addressed later
in the paper.
11. See Hornbeck, supra note 7, at 8.
12. Agustino Fontevecchia, The Real Story of How a Hedge Fund Detained a
Vessel in Ghana and Even Went for Argentina’s ‘Air Force One,’ FORBES (Oct. 5, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/10/05/the-real-story-behind-the-argen
tine-vessel-in-ghana-and-how-hedge-funds-tried-to-seize-the-presidential-plane/.
13. See Hornbeck, supra note 7, at 8.
14. It goes without saying that these funds stood to profit from the deal because
they bought the bonds—pennies on the dollar, before the first settlement.
15. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2010).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2008).
17. This is why this case is so fascinating. There are so many legal questions
lurking in the background, yet everything hinges on the interpretation of a single
(boilerplate) clause in the agreement—making this one of the largest known contract
disputes.
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one; specifically, the definition of the pari passu clause. Because
the issue was not what the ramifications of the decision would be,
the vulture funds secured victory for its investors—at the expense
of poor Argentinians that need infrastructure, and more gener-
ally, at the expense of international bond markets.
Pari passu is the contractual equivalent of “all for one and one
for all.” Pari passu means “by equal step” in Latin.18 The vulture
funds19 argued that this clause requires the government to pay all
the bondholders equally. Because Argentina was paying the bond-
holders who settled, and not the holdouts, it was in violation of
this clause.20 The vulture funds sought an injunction that would
prohibit U.S. banks from issuing payments to the funds that set-
tled. The vulture funds even tried to seize an Argentinian naval
ship21 by arguing that any Argentinian assets could be seized in
lieu of payment of money owed to the funds.22
It is important to note that the funds’ reading of the pari
passu clause is not the only interpretation. The Argentinian gov-
ernment had an equally plausible reading of the clause in ques-
tion.  One scholar noted that “[n]o one seems quite sure what the
clause really means, at least in the context of a loan to a sovereign
borrower.”23 The pari passu clause reads:
The Securities will constitute . . . direct, unconditional,
unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the Republic
and shall at all time rank pari passu without any prefer-
ence among themselves. The payment obligations of the
Republic under the Securities shall at all times rank at least
equally with all its other present and future unsecured and
18. PARI PASSU, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
19. “Vulture funds” is a term widely used to describe the holdout bondholders.
20. Granted, the settled bondholders were getting less than a 100 percent of their
investment, the vulture funds argued that any payment triggered the pari passu
clause.
21. See Sam Jones & Jude Webber, Argentine Ship Seized in Asset Fight, FIN.
TIMES (OCT. 3, 2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/edb12a4e-0d92-11e2-97a1-00144
feabdc0.html#axzz2iJ9EW4gK.
22. Id.
23. Lee C. Buchheit, The Pari Passu Clause Sub Specie Aeternitatis, 10 INT’L FIN.
L. REV. 11, 11 (1991); see also G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56
BUS. LAW 635, 646 (2001) (noting that “[i]n the sovereign context there is at least
disagreement about the meaning of the clause.”); see also Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu
Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1134 (2006) (observing that “[t]he
leading commentators on sovereign contracts acknowledged that there exists
ambiguity as to the meaning of the clause”); see generally PHILLIP R. WOOD, PROJECT
FINANCE, SUBORDINATED DEBT AND STATE LOANS 165 (1995) (finding that “[i]n the
state context, the meaning of the clause is uncertain because there is no hierarchy of
payments which is legally enforced under a bankruptcy regime.”).
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unsubordinated External Indebtedness . . . .24
The competing interpretations were brought to light when the
case was argued in the Southern District of New York and then on




NML Capital is a subsidiary of Elliott Associates, a New York
based hedge fund.26 Elliott Associates has successfully used its
position as a vulture fund against other governments.27 Typically,
a vulture fund can profit in three ways: (1) by buying a sovereign’s
default debt, and if the market improves, then the vulture fund
profits to the degree that the debt price increased; (2) if there is
any increase in the bond price, the fund is in a stronger negotiat-
ing position because holding out longer is not as risky; and (3) the
fund may sue the sovereign to collect the face value of the bond.
Elliott has taken the third approach, and in at least in one scena-
rio, profited 400%.28
The first major legal victory by a vulture fund was against
Peru.29 The Southern District of New York agreed with Elliott that
if a country paid some of its creditors, but not others, the pari
passu clause was violated.30 The court’s decision was largely based
on a narrow interpretation of the pari passu clause.31 Much like its
current case against Argentina, Elliott purchased approximately
10 million dollars of Peruvian bonds.32 Rebuffing Peru’s attempts
24. The Pari Passu Clause and the Argentine Case, ALLEN & OVERY 4 (Dec. 27,
2012), http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/The%20pari%20passu
%20clause%20and%20the%20Argentine%20case.pdf.
25. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Rep. of Arg., 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012).




28. See generally Robert Auray, Note, In Bonds We Trustee: A New Contractual
Mechanism to Improve Sovereign Bond Restructurings, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 899, 914
(2013).
29. See Pravin Banker Assoc., Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 895 F. Supp. 660
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also Pravin Banker Assoc., Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 109
F.3d 850 (2d Cir. 1997).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Pravin Bankers Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru (Pravin I), 165
B.R. 379, 382 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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to settle the case for pennies on the dollar, Elliott sued to recover
the full value of the bonds.33  In Pravin I, Peru argued to the
Southern District of New York that comity, a legal doctrine which
allows United States courts to defer to the decisions of foreign sov-
ereigns if those decisions do not conflict with American interests,
prevented the plaintiff from obtaining an injunction from a foreign
court.34,35 Peru argued that Elliott was a private hedge fund that
was stubbornly refusing to settle the defaulted bonds at the
(lower) market rate. Additionally, Peru argued that the interests
of the United States were not implicated in this case and an
injunction should not be issued.36 Pravin argued that New York
had a significant interest in seeing the contract between the par-
ties enforced because the parties chose New York law to govern
any potential disputes between them.37 As a result, Pravin argued
that comity was inapplicable here.38
Initially, the Southern District of New York issued a number
of stays, partially in order to give the parties ample time to negoti-
ate.39,40 After negotiations failed, however, the Court ruled against
Peru—ordering Peru to pay fully on the bonds that the Plaintiff
held.41 The Second Circuit affirmed the ruling, holding that
“broader interests of enforcing contract provisions” were superior
to Peru’s comity argument.42 Peru attempted to circumvent the
ruling by paying the interest due to the renegotiated bondholders
through a Brussels bank.43 Elliott, in an ex parte motion, asked a
Brussels court to enjoin the bank from making the payments.44
The Court agreed.45
The victory, however, was a largely empty one because win-
ning a case and recovering damages are not synonymous. There
have been many victories against sovereigns in United States
33. See generally Gulati & Klee, supra note 23, at 635.
34. Pravin I, 165 B.R. at 384.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 385.
37. Id. at 386-89.
38. Id. at 386.
39. Id.
40. The stays were a possible early indication by the court that it would rather not
settle this dispute through conventional contract law.
41. See Pravin Banker Assoc., Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 895 F. Supp. 660,
668 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
42. Pravin Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 856 (2d
Cir. 1997).
43. See Gulati & Klee, supra note 23, at 635-37.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 636.
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courts that never resulted in payment to the plaintiffs. Notable
examples include litigation against Cuba, Iran, and Syria.46 Win-
ning in court is one thing— enforcement is another.47 That’s where
Elliott came in.
Elliott48 also sued Peru in the Southern District of New
York.49 Having lost with its comity defense against Pravin, Peru
now asserted champerty.50,51 The district court, surprisingly,
allowed the champerty defense and dismissed the case.52 On
appeal, the Second Circuit disagreed.53 The Second Circuit held
that Elliott’s intention was not to harass Peru, but rather to
enforce the contract provisions that implicated New York law.54
The victory put Elliott in the same state as Pravin—victory in
hand, but no enforcement provision in sight. Elliott tried to obtain
attachment orders against Peruvian assets. Specifically, Elliott
tried to freeze Peruvian assets that were payments to the bond-
holders of the settled bonds.55 The attachment orders Elliott
sought were on assets all over the world, including, but not limited
to assets in the United States, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands,
England, Luxembourg, and Germany.56 The Southern District of
New York, on remand from the Second Circuit, effectively
enjoined Chase Bank from making payments to the Peruvian
bondholders that had settled.57 Peru attempted to do an end-
around by commissioning Euroclear, a clearinghouse in Brussels,
to make the payments.58 Elliott, however, sued for an attachment
46. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Cuban Exile Awarded $2.8B in Suit Against Castro
Government, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
cuban_exile_awarded_2.8b_in_suit_against_castro_government (Cuba); see also
Marcy Oster, Bombing Victim’s Family Wins $323M Judgment Against Iran, Syria,
JTA (May, 16, 2012), http://www.jta.org/2012/05/16/news-opinion/united-states/
bombing-victims-family-wins-323m-judgment-against-iran-syria (Iran and Syria).
47. See generally Cassens Weiss, supra note 46.
48. The Pravin suit was not brought by Elliott.
49. See Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Rep. of Peru, 12 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
50. Id. at 344.
51. Id.
52. See Elliott Assocs., L.P., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 345, 360.
53. See Elliott Assocs., L.P., 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999).
54. See id. at 381.
55. See Auray, supra note 28, at 914; see also Michael Bradley, James D. Cox &
Mitu Gulati, The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and Their Antidotes: Lessons from
the Sovereign Debt Market, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 292 (2010).
56. See Auray, supra note 28, at 915.
57. See Elliott Assocs. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.R.D. 116, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
58. See Christopher C. Wheeler & Amir Attaran, Declawing the Vulture Funds:
Rehabilitation of a Comity Defense in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L.
253, 257 (2003).
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order against Euroclear in a Brussels court.59 The Brussels court
declined to issue an injunction.60 The Court of Appeals of Brussels
granted the injunction.61 As a result, Peru had two alternatives:
pay Elliott or risk not being able to raise capital. Not being able to
pay the settled bonds would have been catastrophic for Peru.
Among other problems, non-payment would trigger acceleration
clauses in other bonds, which would cause Peru to default on
almost all of its sovereign obligations.62 Peru was not going to let
this happen. It reached an out of court settlement with Elliott for
$56.3 million dollars.63 The fact that the court agreed with its
interpretation was more important to Elliott than the monetary
award. The award, in essence, gave Elliott the license to recycle
this strategy on a larger scale.
The world’s leaders reacted swiftly. Gordon Brown, the Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer in the United Kingdom at the time, said,
“[the U.K.] particularly condemns the perversity [of] Vulture
Funds purchas[ing] debt at a reduced price and mak[ing] a profit
from suing the debtor country to recover the full amount owed—a
morally outrageous outcome.”64 The United States Department of
Justice filed a “statement of interest” brief in the litigation against
Argentina.65 The issue of vulture fund activities also reached the
meetings of the G-7 Finance Ministers in 2007. In a meeting in
Washington, D.C., the Finance Ministers expressed that they
“remain[ed] concerned about the problem of aggressive litigation
against heavily indebted poor countries (“HIPC”) . . . urg[ed] all
sovereign creditors not to on-sell claims on HIPCs, and [were]
examining additional steps that might be taken.”66 Finally, Con-
gress considered two separate bills, H.R. 2493 and H.R. 2932, that
essentially outlawed tactics of the vulture funds.67
Elliott’s tactics, forcing Peru to pay a hefty settlement to hold-
outs, was the first of its kind in the history of the sovereign bond
market. Most hedge funds would be proud of its accomplish-
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. LP Elliott Assocs. No. 2000/QR/92 (Court of Appeals of Brussels, 8th Chamber
Belg. Sept. 26, 2000).
62. See Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 58, at 258.
63. Id.
64. Dr. Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, The Pari Passu Interpretation in the Elliott
Case: A Brilliant Strategy but an Awful (Mid-Long Term) Outcome?, 40 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 39, 58 (2011).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 59.
67. See id.
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ments—for Elliott this victory was a stepping-stone to the real
prize—the massive Argentinian bond market.
B. Argentina
Argentina boasts a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of more
than $510 billion, making it one of the largest economies in South
America.68 The World Bank classifies Argentina’s economy as an
upper middle-income economy.69 Argentina is also considered an
emerging market and is one of the G-20’s major economies.70 Like
many sovereigns, Argentina financed major projects by issuing
sovereign bonds. When Argentina defaulted on its sovereign debt
in 2001,71 the stage was set for the largest default bond litigation
in history. Law and economics allow the fact finder to view the
case from both an economic and legal perspective.
III. LAW AND ECONOMICS
The interdisciplinary approach to law and economics has
slowly made inroads in the United States’ judicial system. Some
even argue that it has reached “international prominence.”72 The
main problem that law and economics faces is that “[i]t is difficult
for the movement to penetrate the doctrinal approach of civil law
jurists . . .”73 Law and economics is a way of thinking that puts
significant weight on efficiency and market forces. The law, on its
own, is often constricted to “the four corners of the document” or
whether there was a “meeting of the minds.” As one scholar put it,
“[t]raditional academic commentary has served as an important
doctrinal purpose in advising courts on the proper interpretations
of legal rules.”74
Although non-economists erroneously associate economics
with money, capitalism, and selfishness, the essence of economics
is something else altogether.75 Law and economics is an “[a]nalysis
68. Argentina, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/argentina/
overview (last updated Oct. 9, 2014).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Argy Bargy, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.economist.com/news/
finance-and-economics/21567386-argy-bargy.
72. See John Linarelli, Law and Economics: The International Library of Critical
Writings in Economics, Richard A. Posner and Francesco Parisi, 17 WIS. INT’L L.J.
509, 509 (1999).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 510.
75. Richard A. Posner, Values and Consequences: An Introduction to Economic
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consist[ing] of tracing out the consequences of assuming that peo-
ple are more or less rational in their social interactions.”76,77
Another assumption is that a person is a “rational utility maxi-
mizer in all areas of life—not just in his ‘economic affairs.’”78 Con-
sider a law student deciding whether or not to take a class from an
undesirable professor. Initially, she might resist choosing such a
course. If, however, she found out that the professor gives a higher
number of “A’s” than other professors, the student will be more
inclined to take the “undesirable” course. In essence, the professor
has compensated the student for the “low perceived value” of the
course by giving higher grades.79
Many legal scholars considered law and economics a “fad.”80
However, due to the scholarship of Judges Richard Posner and
Guido Calabresi, it seems that law and economics “has success-
fully found a place at the core of the legal arguments made in
courts, administrative agencies, and other legal settings.”81 In
fact, “[j]udicial opinions refer to economic concepts and cite eco-
nomic books and articles; and a number of federal judges, includ-
ing a Justice of the Supreme Court (Stephen Breyer) are alumni of
the law and economics movement.”82
A. An Example of a Law and Economics Analysis
One scholar examines the doctrine of law and economics by
applying it to the adoption market. He argues that charging pro-
spective parents for adoptions would properly incentivize parents
Analysis of Law 2-3 (Chicago Law Sch. Coase-Sandor Inst. Law & Econ., Working
Paper No. 53, 1998), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/53.Posner.Values_0.pdf.
76. Id. at 3.
77. Assumptions are a vital part of economics, some argue to a fault. To illustrate,
consider the following: A shipwreck has left a physicist, a chemist, and an economist
without food on a deserted island. They find a can of beans that needs to be opened.
The physicist proposes to open the can by throwing it up at the perfect velocity and
landing it on a rock, thus opening the can. The chemist counters that it would be
better to boil the can until the top is melted away. Not satisfied with either approach,
the economist says he has come up with the most efficient solution. Assume a can
opener. Id. at 1.
78. Posner, supra note 75, at 4.
79. Id. at 3.
80. See Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 905, 905 (1980) (“I have the strong feeling that the economic analysis of law has
‘peaked out’ as the latest fad in legal scholarship.”); see also Owen M. Fiss, The Law
Regained, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 245 (1989) (“law and economics . . . seems to have
peaked.”).
81. Bryant G. Garth, Strategic Research in Law and Society, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
57, 59 (1990).
82. Posner, supra note 75, at 2.
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to invest in the well-being of the child.83 He argues that child
abuse is not the “normal motive for adopting a child,” as such “the
willingness to pay money for a baby would seem on the whole a
reassuring factor from the standpoint of child welfare.”84 Law and
economics demands that the court ask questions such as: “Since
few people buy television sets in order to smash them, could we
allow payment for adoptions in this jurisdiction”? At first, the
question seems foolish. What do television sets and adoptions
have in common? After further thought, however, the line of rea-
soning becomes a little clearer. People are generally rational with
money; by charging for an item (television sets or babies), the
seller could discern how much the potential buyer really wants the
item. There seems to be a rule that consumers follow: the more
costly a purchase, the more care the purchaser will lavish on it.
Recent studies suggest that the more costly it is for parents to
obtain a child, the more they will invest in the child’s quality
attributes, such as health and education.85 Does this type of analy-
sis rule out the possibility that one pedophile will purchase a baby
and go on to abuse that child? Of course not. Law and economics
urge courts to look at the aggregate. Overall, babies that are
adopted might be better cared for in a pay-for-adoption scheme
than the alternative.
Suppose a country passed a law, as most have, that prohibits
payment for adoptions out of concern for child abuse. Some chil-
dren might be spared the horrors of abuse, but most children
would suffer from being adopted into families that are not as
invested in raising children as those families that are willing to
pay for an adoption. In other words, problem solving through the
judiciary is limited because the law is often times crippled with
tunnel vision and creating unwanted inefficiencies, which are con-
trary to the law’s intent to begin with.  Here, the law is intended
to protect children from abuse; however, by denying parents the
ability to pay for an adoption, the courts are giving access to par-
ents who are less qualified to properly care for the adopted child—
or worse, that might abuse the child. Money can serve as an
important screening tool that separates fit and unfit parents.
Unfortunately, in most jurisdictions, this valuable tool is unavail-
able. The law does not have all of the answers.
Applying the same rationale to the Argentinian bond crisis,
83. Linarelli, supra note 72, at 513.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 513.
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the court’s punitive remedy86 is too shortsighted. The court wants
to punish Argentina for breaking its contract; however, the vul-
ture funds invested in the funds after Argentina defaulted. The
real victims, the original bond buyers that sold their stake to
NML, cannot be made whole. They already sold their shares to
NML for pennies on the dollar. The punitive punishment, there-
fore, only benefits a large hedge fund that is market driven. A
court applying a law and economics theory would reach a far dif-
ferent outcome in both this case and the Peru case discussed ear-
lier. The original bondholders would have received a larger
settlement because the vulture funds would not expect to fully col-
lect on the bonds. While the court intends to punish Argentina,
the only people hurting are the Argentinian citizens and the rest
of the developing countries. Had the court not been motivated to
punish the Argentinian government for “flagrantly” breaking the
contract when they had no choice in the matter (because of the
debt GDP ratio being over 100 percent), the investors would have
been better off.
B. Differences Between Sovereign Debt and Private
Debt
The differences between sovereign and private debt highlight
the importance of the international bond market. Countries need
financing for massive projects that banks are ill equipped to
finance. It is a questionable practice for a court to insert itself into
the international bond market “in the interest of New York con-
tract law” when the contract law of the state is ill-equipped to deal
with a scenario with far reaching consequences—such as sover-
eign default. There are at least three differences between sover-
eign debt and private debt. First, a sovereign can always repay its
debt87 because it almost always has the option of raising taxes on
its constituents.88,89 Furthermore, a sovereign can take funds from
another project and repay its debt.90 Although this would leave the
project in question unfunded, the debt could always be repaid. A
private corporation, on the other hand, does not have these
86. As will be discussed in detail later, the court essentially ordered Argentina to
repay the vulture funds in full.
87. See Auray, supra note 28, at 905.
88. Id.
89. There are exceptions to this proposition. Recently, Greece could not meet its
obligations, despite its taxing power. As a general rule, however, most economists
agree that the power to tax makes sovereigns a “safe” investment.
90. See Auray, supra note 28, at 905.
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options at its disposal. A private company is limited to the assets
that it has. It can go beyond its assets by asking for a loan or by
selling stock. Ultimately, however, the financial strength of the
company will dictate the degree to which the company will be suc-
cessful in fundraising. A private company certainly does not have
the luxury of taxing its employees or officers. Therefore, at least
theoretically, a sovereign is generally in a better position to repay
its debts than a private company.
Second, sovereigns almost never use collateral to secure its
debt.91 It is illogical to take collateral against a sovereign unless
the debtor is in possession of the collateral outside of the sover-
eign’s jurisdiction, because then the sovereign has the ability to
rule that the debtor is not entitled to the collateral.92 This is espe-
cially true in emerging economies where the judicial branch of
government is not fully independent from the legislative branch.
Private debt, on the other hand, is almost always securitized in
some way.93 The collateral gives the debtor some assurance that
the debt will be serviced.94 In the event that it is not, the creditor
could seize the collateral and ask a court to enforce the contract.
The same is simply not true in the case of a sovereign.
The lack of collateral eventually led Elliott to seize an Argen-
tinian Naval Ship docked in Ghana.95 The fact that the naval ship
was docked in Ghana allowed Elliott to “collateralize” it, because
Elliott held a U.S. judgment against Argentina.96 Argentina was
at the mercy of Ghana’s court, which eventually ruled in favor of
Argentina.97 However, the episode highlighted the importance of
the securitization of debt. Although Elliott was ultimately unsuc-
cessful in seizing the naval ship, it was successful in sending a
message to the Argentinian government that, much like the litiga-
tion against Peru where Elliott went to numerous countries’
courts for relief, Argentina’s assets were not safe from lawsuits
anywhere in the world—not even Ghana.
Finally, at least in pre Elliot-styled litigation, creditors have
91. Id. at 906.
92. See generally id.
93. See id. at 905.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 906.
96. See Auray, supra note 28, at 906; see also Drew Benson, Bond Vigilantes’
Ghana Ambush Proves Default Hex Unbroken, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Oct. 4, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-04/bond-vigilantes-ghana-trap-shows-de
fault-hex-argentina-credit.html.
97. See Auray, supra note 28, at 906.
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very limited relief options from the courts when the sovereign con-
text is compared to that of private debt.98 As discussed earlier,
courts sitting in the sovereign are unlikely to be of any help. Inter-
national courts are severely limited in enforcing judgments
against sovereigns. In fact, many countries have laws similar to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which makes it difficult to
sue a sovereign let alone collect from one. Conversely, collecting
from a private company is as simple as filing a complaint against
it in the appropriate court. If the company is insolvent, the credi-
tor may ask for relief from a bankruptcy court. However, there are
no international bankruptcy courts that have jurisdiction over
sovereigns.99 Therefore, settlement is the only option for any
holder of defaulted sovereign bonds.
In light of the above, the parties in these settlement negotia-
tions are not on equal footing. Once a sovereign defaults, it can
basically dictate the terms of the restructure. Because the debt is
unsecured, there is the absence of an international bankruptcy
regime, and judicial enforcement is nearly impossible. Bondhold-
ers have no viable recourse to collect. They cannot sue—even if
they could sue, they cannot collect—and they hold no collateral.
Even though the creditors do not have anything tangible to bar-
gain with, they may have some “intangible” bargaining chips.
C. Creditors’ Intangible Bargaining Chips
The first of these chips is the “economic dislocation” that will
ensue if the sovereign defaults and refuses to negotiate with credi-
tors in good faith.100 Economic dislocation includes the blocking of
lenders of last resort in bailing the sovereign out of financial insol-
vency or illiquidity.101 A lender of last resort at the international
stage is similar to the “discount window” at the Federal Reserve
Bank of the United States.102 In the United States, banks must
hold a certain amount of cash in proportion to its debt at the close
of each business day.103 Banks are sometimes short, and in order
to meet that day’s requirement, they often borrow from other
banks. If other banks are unwilling to lend to the troubled bank, it
can borrow the funds from the Federal Reserve’s discount win-
98. Id.
99. Id. at 907.
100. Id. at 908.
101. Id.
102. See The Discount Rate, FEDERAL RESERVE,  http://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/discountrate.htm (last updated Feb. 24, 2015).
103. Id.
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dow—a practice frowned upon by the banks because it creates a
perception that the bank is not trustworthy.104 Here, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the World Bank act as lenders of last
resort to sovereigns.105 As a result, sovereigns are unwilling to
allow themselves to be in positions of economic dislocation.106
A second “intangible bargaining chip” that creditors have is
that sovereigns are worried about its reputations.107 This is largely
common sense; if a sovereign defaults on its debt and offers to pay
a penny on the dollar, no one would ever lend to them again. This
phenomenon is known as a “lender embargo.”108 A lender embargo
is essentially a black list.109 No country wants to be on this list
because if a sovereign is unable to raise money through bonds, it
will be unable to finance major infrastructure projects such as
roads, defense, national heath-care, or the army.110 Therefore,
countries are hesitant to turn to opportunistic restructurings.
Ecuador’s 2008 default is an example of an opportunistic restruc-
turing. Although the ratio of Ecuador’s debt to Gross Domestic
Product was only 23 percent, Ecuador defaulted on its debt and
negotiated a restructured payment, giving the bond-holders 65 to
70 cents on the dollar.111 The ratio of Argentina’s debt to its Gross
Domestic Product was 130%.112 The contrast is truly striking.
Even though the creditors are not sitting at the table without
any chips, no one could legitimately argue that the creditors and
the sovereigns have equal bargaining power. In order to even the
parties’ bargaining power in sovereign bond restructurings, the
International Money Fund introduced the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM).113
D. The SDRM
In 2003, in response to growing litigation in the distressed
debt arena, the IMF proposed a way to restructure unsustainable
debt efficiently. The SDRM was a failed attempt to create a cen-
104. See generally Olivier Armantier et. al., Discount Window During the 2007-
2008 Financial Crisis, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. 1 (Sept. 2013), http://www.new
yorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr483.pdf.
105. See Auray, supra note 28, at n.75.
106. Id. at 908.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 909.
109. See generally id.
110. See Auray, supra note 28, at 909.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 916.
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tral authority to control debt restructurings. The SDRM had four
main functions: (1) it would prevent vulture funds, like Elliott,
from disturbing the settlement process; (2) it guaranteed to credi-
tors that the sovereign would pay some creditors and not others;
(3) similar to some bankruptcy codes, new creditors were given
preferred creditor status; and (4) in order to prevent vulture funds
from disturbing the settlement process, once a certain pre-deter-
mined percentage of bond holders accepted the restructuring
agreement, the deal was binding on all bond holders.114 Although
the IMF had high hopes for the SDRM, the international commu-
nity never accepted it.115 One scholar claimed that the SDRM
failed because the IMF “[h]ad given itself unreasonable powers
under the SDRM to pre-determine the outcome of the debt
restructuring process.”116 The failure of the SDRM is important
because it highlights the complexity of this case. Specifically, if an
international organization charged with maintaining the health of
the global economy was unable to resolve the distressed debt
dilemma, then is it rational to expect a New York court to effi-
ciently solve this problem? With this backdrop, we now turn to the
Argentinian bond crisis.
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE PARI
PASSU CLAUSE
Elliott, specifically its subsidiary NML Capital, sued the
Republic of Argentina in the Southern District of New York.117
Plaintiff alleged breach of contract, and sought injunctive relief,
asking the Court to enforce the contract’s Equal Treatment Provi-
sion.118 The contract between the parties is governed by New York
law and allows jurisdiction in any State or Federal court in New
York.119  However, as part of its sovereign bond default, Argentina
passed the “Lock Law,” which does not allow it to recognize any
judgment from the New York courts.120 In December 2012, the dis-
trict court ruled that whenever the Argentinian government
“[l]owers the rank of its payment  obligations under [plaintiffs’]
114. Id. at 916-17.
115. Id. at 917.
116. See Ann Pettifor, The IMF’s New Consultation on an SDRM: Reflections on the
Last SDRM, PRIME ECONOMICS (May 30, 2013), http://www.primeeconomics.org/
articles/1864.
117. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Rep. of Arg., 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012).
118. See id. at 253.
119. Id. at 254.
120. Id.
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Bonds below that of any other present or future  unsecured and
unsubordinated External indebtedness,” it violates the Equal
Treatment Provision.121 The district court observed that Argentina
lowered NML’s status by treating it unfairly in two ways: (1)
“when it made payments currently due under the Exchange
Bonds, while persisting in its refusal to satisfy its payment obliga-
tions currently due under [plaintiffs’] Bonds,” and (2) “when it
enacted [the Lock Law] and [the Lock Law Suspension].”122 The
district court explained:
It’s hard for me to believe that there is not a violation of the
[Equal Treatment Provision] accomplished by the [Argen-
tinian] congressional legislation in ‘05 and ‘ 10, simply say-
ing that the Republic will not honor these judgments. It is
difficult to imagine anything would reduce the rank, reduce
the equal status or simply wipe out the equal status of
these bonds under the [Equal Treatment Provision] [more
than the Lock Law and the Lock Law Suspension]. . . . [The
Equal Treatment Provision] can’t be interpreted to allow
the Argentine government to simply declare that these
judgments will not be paid, and that’s what they have
done.123
The fact that Peru lost in the Second Circuit with its comity and
champerty arguments left Argentina with only one option—it had
to argue that non-payment to the vulture funds did not violate the
pari passu clause of the contract between Argentina and the vul-
ture funds. In order to bolster its argument, Argentina convinced
Anne Krueger, who unsuccessfully promoted the SDRM as the
deputy chief of the International Monetary Fund, to argue that
NML’s proposed interpretation of the pari passu clause would be
devastating to the international bond markets.124 Krueger’s argu-
ment was four-fold: (1) debt sustainability; (2) importance of inter-
national capital market for emerging markets; (3) need for short
term external funding; and (4) likely negative consequences of the
court decision on the sovereign debt bond market.125
Krueger argued that sometimes debt for a sovereign is simply
unsustainable. For instance, a sovereign’s major export might
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 254.
124. See generally Brief for Amicus Curiae Professor Anne Krueger in Support of
the Republic of Argentina, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Rep. of Arg., 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir.
2012) (No. 12-105) [hereinafter Krueger Brief].
125. Id. at 3.
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have decreased in price. As a result, the sovereign has less capital
at its disposal and it must prioritize between servicing the bonds
and paying for pressing domestic obligations such as the army,
defense, police, etc.126 The sovereign has the option of printing
more money, but that is of little help due to the fact that the mar-
ket will absorb the new money, and in turn, the currency will be
“devalued.” Also, more of the money will be needed to service the
debt—in essence, taking the situation back to square one. Increas-
ing taxes is not a feasible option either due to the fact that “some
of these countries’ governments incurred rising fiscal deficits
because tax revenues were down (due to domestic recession or
other reasons), and fiscal expenditures increased to offset the
effects of recession.”127
Krueger also tried to impress upon the court the importance
of the international capital market for emerging markets. She
argued that because of the absence of an international bankruptcy
regime for sovereigns, it is imperative that debt be restructured
expeditiously because a sovereign’s ability to meet its debts will
often be in question.128 Furthermore, the lack of a bankruptcy
regime and the fact that a sovereign cannot be forced to sell off
assets, makes the resolution of this magnitude in court highly
inefficient.129
Thirdly, Krueger argued that sovereigns have a pressing need
for short term external funding for the same reasons that the sov-
ereign is defaulting on its sovereign bonds. If the court does not
allow the sovereign to restructure the debt for market price, but
rather forces Argentina to pay full price on its obligations, then
Argentina will almost certainly have to default. The reason for
this is self-evident. If a country needs to renegotiate its obligations
because it cannot meet them, judiciously forcing them to meet its
obligations hardly seems to be an efficient solution.130 If the judici-
ary hijacks the case, then a country will not be able to get short
term financing because it will have to pay its outstanding debt
first. The pool of potential lenders that are willing to expose them-
selves to such high risk situations is thus decreased.
Finally, Krueger argued that a court’s intervention will likely
126. Id.
127. Id. at 5.
128. Id. at 7.
129. Id.
130. Krueger Brief, supra note 124, at 9.
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have negative consequences on the international sovereign bond
market in general. Repurcussions include:
(1) the increased reluctance of creditors to share in any
restructuring and hence an increase in the likelihood and
number of holdouts; (2) higher interest costs for all sover-
eign borrowers; (3) a reduction in capital inflows even for
countries with sound macroeconomic policies; (4) increased
delays by sovereigns before accepting the need for restruc-
turing and thus higher costs to borrower and creditors
alike; and (5) issues for the International Monetary Fund
in supporting countries where policy reform could lead to a
return to debt sustainability and voluntary debt-servicing
if debt were restructured.131
In other words, Krueger was arguing that this case was not simply
about money. Rather, the future of the international sovereign
bond market—and more importantly, the role that the bonds play
in developing emerging nations—was at stake. Krueger ended her
amicus brief by observing that “[a]ll of these consequences would
reduce prospects for growth in developing countries, increase the
costs to creditors and debtors of debt resolution, harm the interna-
tional sovereign debt market, and reduce the ability of the private
international capital market to enhance the growth of developing
countries.”132 The court, however, was unimpressed.133
In light of Argentina’s refusal to pay the holdouts, the district
court first issued a temporary restraining order, which enjoined
Argentina from:
altering or amending the processes or specific transfer
mechanisms (including the use of specific firms) by which it
makes payments due to holders of bonds or other securities
issued pursuant to its 2005 and 2030 exchange offers,
including without limitation by using agents, financial
intermediaries and financial vehicles other than those used
at the time of this Order.134
This injunction was a major signal as to how the district court
would rule on the underlying case. Later, in February 2012, the
district court ordered Argentina to “[p]erform [on] its obligations”
under the pari passu clause. Specifically, any time that the Argen-
tinians pay any amount under the terms of the Exchange bonds,
131. Id. at 12.
132. Id. at 17-18.
133. The court’s reasoning is detailed below.
134. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Rep. of Arg., 699 F.3d 246, 254 (2d Cir. 2012).
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“[they] must concurrently or in advance pay plaintiffs the same
fraction of the amount due to them.”135 In other words, Argentina
would have to pay the holdouts any time it made a payment to the
Exchange bondholders. The district court ordered that the injunc-
tion should be issued to all banks engaging in business with
Argentina. The significance of this particular injunction cannot be
stressed enough because the injunction did not allow Argentina to
circumvent the court’s ruling by going to the banks of different
countries to make payments to the Exchange bondholders.136 The
court was concerned that the injunction would not be followed
because the Argentinian government refused to follow the judg-
ments of the Southern District of New York. The court reasoned
that by codifying the Lock Law and the Lock Suspension, the
Argentinians were signaling their intention to defy any ruling of
the American courts that went against Argentina’s interests. The
court justified issuing the injunction on a different basis as well.
The district court stated that:
[t]he public interest of enforcing contracts and upholding
the rule of law will be served by the issuance of these
injunctions, particularly here, where creditors of the
Republic have no recourse to bankruptcy regimes to protect
their interests and must rely upon courts to enforce con-
tractual promises. No less than any other entering into a
commercial transaction, there is a strong public interest in
holding the Republic [Argentina] to its contractual
obligations.137
The problem with this view is that it is circular: the obligation of
the Republic to pay was only the “rule of law” because the district
said so. Had the district court ruled in favor of the Argentinians,
there would be no contractual obligation. The factors the court
considered in making its decision and what weight it assigned to
each argument was truly critical.
A. Other Interpretations of the Clause
As discussed earlier, there is no settled interpretation of the
pari passu clause. Consider France’s argument to the Supreme
Court, in which it urged the Court to overrule the Second Circuit:
The market understanding of a pari passu clause - most of
135. Id.
136. Recall the litigation against Peru, discussed earlier, that similarly barred Peru
from circumventing the court’s decision.
137. NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 256.
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which are drafted as a variant of the clause appearing in
Argentina’s defaulted bonds - is that it is a legal ranking
covenant, intended to ensure that the borrower’s obliga-
tions will rank equally in right of payment among each
other, within a particular series of bonds, and with all of
the sovereign borrower’s other unsubordinated external
indebtedness.138
In fact, the United States agreed with France’s position stat-
ing, “[T]he district court’s interpretation of the pari passu clause
. . . deviate[d] from decades of settled market expectations.”139 The
Second Circuit’s interpretation, moreover, is contrary to interna-
tional capital markets because the principal participants in those
markets “[d]o not interpret the pari passu clause as a covenant
that would condition certain creditors’ receipt of payments to
which they are entitled on the debtor’s willingness and ability to
pay other creditors.”140 In fact, France argued that the last time a
court misinterpreted the pari passu clause, the legislature
stepped in and codified the correct interpretation, which was nec-
essary to disrupt international capital markets.141 France was
referring to the Belgian Court of Appeals, which upheld Elliott’s
reading of the pari passu clause against Peru. The Belgian legisla-
ture subsequently declined to follow that interpretation.142 Moreo-
ver, France argued that NML’s interpretation was counter to that
of European scholars.143 The prevailing view is reinforced by his-
torical experience as the pari passu clause never impeded sover-
eign restructurings in the 1980’s and 1990’s.144
The United States’ opposition to the Second’s Circuit’s ruling
can be summarized as follows:
The panel believed that the first sentence of the pari passu
clause prohibits “the issuance of other superior debt” and
the second prohibits “the giving of priority to other pay-
138. Brief for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae in Support of Argentina’s
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Rep. of Arg. (No. 13-990)
[hereinafter France Brief].
139. Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Reversal at 5, NML Capital, Ltd., v. Rep. of Arg., 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 12-
105) [hereinafter United States Brief].
140. France Brief, supra note 138, at 7.
141. Id. at 9.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 8 (“French legal authorities insist that a contrary interpretation of
the pari passu clause, such as that espoused by the Court of Appeals is both ‘difficult
to admit’ and ‘lacking support’ as much as from the practice of financial credits as
from doctrinal thoughts.”).
144. Id.
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ment obligations.” Slip op. at 18-19. The better reading,
however, is that the two sentences separately address
changes in rank within a particular bond issuance and
changes in rank across all external indebtedness, not a
debtor’s obligations as issuer and as payor, see FMLC
Study at 4, as the panel believed. Thus, the first sentence
bars changes in legal rank in bonds “among themselves”
and the second sentence-which requires only that payment
“obligations” (as opposed to the payments themselves) rank
equally-prohibits changes in legal rank among all “Exter-
nal Indebtedness.”145
In other words, the United States argued that the pari passu
clause forbids the ranking of debt within “a particular bond issu-
ance”—not a new issuance of bonds. Consider the reason pari
passu clauses are generally reserved for international agree-
ments. There is less of a need to include the clause in (US) domes-
tic obligations because the “[g]eneral parity of unsecured debt
obligations, absent statutory priorities or the exercise of a court’s
equitable powers of subordination, is well established by law.”146
International debt markets, in contrast, lack the legal guarantees
to protect debtors from subordination.147 Therefore, international
debt agreements include the pari passu clause. Importantly, it is
unlikely that the parties intended the pari passu clause to guard
against anything more than involuntary subordination. In fact,
prior to the December 2012 District Court Orders, no New York
court had endorsed Elliott’s reading of the clause.148
Others argue that “the pari passu clause introduces rein-
forced protection against unfair discrimination in the process of
145. United States Brief, supra note 139.
146. Brief for Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Reversal at 9-10, NMI Capital Ltd., v. Rep. of Arg., 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012) (No.
12-105).
147. See id. at 10 (“In contrast, for non-U.S. debt, it is the practice to include such
clauses in the debt contracts because there is not always the same certainty that the
legal regimes generally applicable to such debtors will necessarily protect creditors
from involuntary subordination.”).
148. See id. at n.15 (“To date no court in New York has adopted either the Elliott or
Nicaragua interpretation of the pari passu clause. The Elliott case was cited but not
followed in Nacional Financiera, S.N.C v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., No. 00 Civ.
1571 (JSM), 2003 WL 1878415 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2003), which noted only that the
presence of an injunction such as was entered in Elliott would present a different
case. Similarly, the English courts have not addressed the merits of the issue with
respect to pari passu clauses in English-law debt instruments. See Kensington Int’l
Ltd v. Republic of the Congo, 2002 No. 1088, transcript at 27 (Eng. Commercial Ct.
Apr. 16, 2003) (noting absence of English authority and denying injunction on
equitable grounds) (A-1991-97).”).
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debt restructuring. The sovereign debtor that would propose bond
exchange offers, with varying contents, to the bondholders, with-
out a defensible reason, would be acting in breach of the pari
passu treatment.”149 The author gives an example of a “defensible”
reason—he claims that a sovereign favoring a national bank
should be considered “defensible,” and courts should be deferential
to the sovereign’s judgment.150 But this interpretation does not
define “defensible” or “indefensible” in any meaningful way. More-
over, in light of the fact that pari passu clauses are likely included
to prevent involuntary subordination, clear boundaries of “defen-
sible” conduct need to be defined. Kupelyants strikes a balance
between NML’s and Argentina’s interpretations by arguing that,
contrary to Argentina’s view, the clause gives some practical pro-
tections to bondholders—not just “legal priorities.”151 The clause
does not, however, require rateable payments to all creditors.152
Although Kupelyants departs from a historical interpretation of
the clause, even he is not willing to embrace the Second Circuit’s
interpretation.
V. THE APPEAL
Argentina raised six issues on appeal. It argued that (1) the
exchange bonds were not given legal preference over the holdout
bonds because both bonds remained “direct, unconditional,
unsecured, and unsubordinated obligations of the Republic.” (It
argued this despite the fact that it is currently paying the
exchange bonds and not the holdout bonds); (2) it is immune to the
violations under the FSIA; (3) the injunction violated New York
law because the assets the injunction restrains are not the prop-
erty of the Argentinian government, but rather they are held in a
trust for the bondholders; (4) because the only damage the plain-
tiffs suffered was monetary, the damage is not irreparable, there-
fore the injunction was unwarranted; (5) the hardship to exchange
bondholders and to the Argentinians (as a people) stemming from
the injunction far outweighs the potential prejudice to the hold-
outs. This is because the holdout bondholders bought their debt
with full knowledge of the limitations on their ability to collect. On
149. See Hayk Kupelyants, Pari Passu Clauses: An Alternative Interpretation,
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the other hand, the injunction will “[t]hrust the Republic into
another economic crisis and undermine the consensual sovereign
debt restructuring process the United States has been at pains to
foster for the past several decades”; and (6) the plaintiffs claim
was barred by laches.153,154,155
This paper will focus on the first and fifth reasons enumer-
ated above. The first reason is an argument that is based on con-
tract interpetation. What did the parties mean by the pari passu
clause? Unfortunately, there is no easy answer to this question. In
light of all these sources that show that the pari passu clause is
unclear, it was unreasonable for the district court and subse-
quently the Second Circuit to rule against Argentina. Specifically,
one of the rationales that the Court gave was that the public inter-
est of enforcing contracts was a driving force behind its decision.
Additionally, the court said that the rule of law must be followed
in order for the public to have confidence in the judicial system.
The counter-argument is that in light of the confusion that
dates back many decades, there is no settled interpretation and
more generally, no rule of law to the pari passu clause.  Therefore,
the court should have decided this issue based on the market. Spe-
cifically, what were the holdout bonds worth at the time the com-
plaint was filed? This is the connection between the first and the
fifth arguments that Argentina unsuccessfully advanced in the
Second Circuit. First, there is no settled law on what the clause
means. Therefore, the market should decide because the harm to
the Argentinians is far greater than the harm to the bondholders.
The argument is strengthened by the fact that the court discusses
the historical problem of interpreting the pari passu clause while
at the same time arguing that the “rule of law” would be violated
if the opposite result were to be reached. Finally, as mentioned
earlier, the “rule of law” argument is circular because it is only
violated because the court ruled that Argentina violated its obliga-
tions—a ruling that was not based on any meaningful historical
precedent.156
153. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Rep. of Arg., 699 F.3d 246, 257 (2d Cir. 2012).
154. “The equitable doctrine by which a court denies relief to a claimant who has
unreasonably delayed in asserting the claim, when that delay has prejudiced the
party against whom relief is sought.” LACHES, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014). Here, the Argentinians were prejudiced by the long delay because the Lock
Law was passed in 2005 and the suit was brought in the in 2010.
155. See NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 256-57.
156. The counterargument that this case creates the law and thus sets precedent is
unconvincing. The stakes were simply too high to use this case as precedent for the
interpretation of the pari passu clause.
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The court started its analysis by noting that under New York
law, a bond is a contract.157 The court found that there is “ample
evidence” that Argentina has given priority to the exchange bond-
holders over the holdouts. Among the reasons the court gave for
its finding were: (1) Argentina made no payments for six years to
the holdouts, during which time Argentina filed with the SEC and
claimed it was not “[u]nder a . . . legal obligation” to pay the hold-
outs; (2) the passage of the Lock Laws imposed a barrier on the
holdouts to collect the debt, while at the same time the exchange
bond holders did not face any legislation that prevented them
from collecting should Argentina default from its bonds again—
the court interpreted this as legal subordination of the debt, thus
presenting a problem even under Argentina’s interpretation of the
pari passu clause; and (3) the practical ramification of the enacted
legislation in Argentina is that the holdouts and the exchange
bondholders are not on same footing in the Argentinian courts,
courts which effectively violated the pari passu clause as well.158
Turning to the fifth argument, the court stated that it does
not agree that the Argentinians have suffered more harm than the
holdout bondholders. The court noted that “Argentina repeatedly
expresses its frustration with plaintiffs for refusing to accept the
exchange offers.”159
But plaintiffs were completely within their rights to reject
the 25–cents-on-the-dollar exchange offers. And because
the FAA does not contain a collective action clause, Argen-
tina has no right to force them to accept a restructuring,
even one approved by a super-majority.160
Whether Argentina is harmed more than the holdouts should
not be the central question that the court considers. This case is
larger than Elliott or Argentina. The Paris Club, a network of gov-
ernments that lend each other money, has convinced France to file
an amicus brief to the United States Supreme Court to review the
case, citing global implications.161 One scholar noted that “[t]he
substance of the brief is less important” because the filing might
157. NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 258.
158. Id. at 260.
159. Id. at n.15; see Appellant’s Br. 47 (“A holder of defaulted debt cannot
voluntarily decline to participate in a restructuring and then afterward assert that
the creditors who elected to settle their claims are a ‘preferred class.’” (emphasis in
original)).
160. Id.
161. Gelpern, supra note 2.
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convince the United States and the IMF to file briefs as well.162
The mere fact that the United States, the IMF, and France would
consider filing briefs on behalf of Argentina speaks volumes as to
the importance of this case. One scholar noted that:
This embargo discourages third parties from dealing with
the sovereign and, if sufficiently costly, can induce the sov-
ereign to comply. Nevertheless, we are skeptical about
injunctions in sovereign debt litigation. They are prone to
dramatic spillover effects precisely because they cannot
reach their primary target, the sovereign government.
Recent decisions in NML v. Argentina illustrate the way in
which a court’s inability to compel compliance by the sover-
eign may lead it to impose dramatic and unwarranted costs
on third parties, turning traditional equitable analysis on
its head.163
This argument is similar to a law and economics argument
because it takes into account the broader costs of the court’s deci-
sion on third parties. Moreover, the “dramatic spillover effects”
are costs that simply cannot be measured in dollars and cents. For
example, if raising money for infrastructure is more costly for gov-
ernments as a result of this decision, how much does that spillover
cost?
Furthermore, what metric did the Second Circuit use in deter-
mining the harm to Argentina? How could one measure the eco-
nomic harm to an entire country due to less infrastructure or the
effects of a lower credit rating? While the harm to Elliott is easily
quantifiable in dollars and cents, the harm to Argentina goes far
beyond money. Indeed, the very future of this developing country
is at stake. Yet, the court thinks that “on balance,” the Argentini-
ans have not suffered more harm than Elliott.  In economic terms
this problem is called “the problem of valuation.”164 The classic
example of a valuation problem is comparing the costs of a breach
of contract to pollution costs.165 In a breach of contract case for a
purchase of goods, the loss of the non-breaching is the value of the
good.166 The affected buyer can be made whole if it recovers the
price of the good at the time of the breach plus any transactional
162. Id.
163. Mark Weidemaier, No Argentine Settlement Yet. Light Reading While You
Wait?, CREDIT SLIPS (Nov. 4, 2013, 6:45 AM) http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/
2013/11/no-argentine-settlement-yet.html.
164. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 123 (2003).
165. Id.
166. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\I\IAL\46-2\IAL203.txt unknown Seq: 27  1-JUN-15 15:09
2015] ARGENTINIAN BOND CRISIS 205
costs.167 The “valuation process,” however, is harder if the loss is
“non-standardized or unique.”168 Consider the valuation process
for someone who was forced to move out of their house due to a
polluting chemical factory. The factory might be in a position, and
even willing, to compensate the family. However, how is the loss
to the family calculated? Some economists have suggested that the
affected individual should determine how much he values the loss
or the gain.169
This approach is criticized for two reasons. The affected indi-
vidual has an incentive to overstate his loss, and more impor-
tantly, two potential questions arise. First, “how much would you
be willing to pay to avoid the loss” or  second, “how much would
you have to be paid to have the loss imposed on you.”170 The
answer to the questions is obviously not the same and thus high-
lights the problem of valuating non-standardized or unique losses.
The “valuation problem” is exacerbated in our scenario because
the affected party is an entire country, making the valuation pro-
cess almost impossible. Therefore, the court’s balancing test of the
relative harms to Argentina and Elliott is correct, remains sus-
pect—at least economically speaking. One possible explanation as
to the court’s rationale is that Argentina’s harm is largely self-
inflicted. It could have designed the bond contracts in a way that
the pari passu clause would not be implicated. In fact, it could
have insisted on leaving the pari passu clause out altogether. In
light of the serious global implications, it hardly seems fair to pun-
ish innocent citizens of Argentina for the mistakes of those who
drafted the bond contract—probably a large New York law firm.171
VI. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S QUESTION
The Second Circuit found the formula imposed by the South-
ern District of New York ambiguous. Specifically, the Second Cir-
cuit observed that the formula:
could be read to mean that if, for example, Argentina owed
the holders of restructured debt $100,000 in interest and
paid 100% of that amount then it would be required to pay
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 124.
170. POLINSKY, supra note 164, at 124.
171. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond
Exchanges, 48 UCLA L. REV. 59, 59 (2000) (“Many of these [sovereign] bonds are
governed by the law of the state of New York.”). If New York law governs the bonds,
New York law firms cannot be too far behind.
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the plaintiffs 100% of the accelerated principal and all
accrued interest. Or it could be read to mean that, if such a
$100,000 payment to the exchange bondholders repre-
sented 1% of the principal and interest outstanding on the
restructured debt, then Argentina must pay plaintiffs 1% of
the amount owed to them. We cannot tell precisely what
result the district court intended.172
To better understand the Second Circuit’s question, a close read-
ing of the district court’s injunctions might be helpful:
a. Whenever the Republic pays any amount due under
terms of the bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to
the Republic’s 2005 or 2030 Exchange Offers, or any subse-
quent exchange of or substitution for the 2005 and 2030
Exchange Offers that may occur in the future (collectively,
the “Exchange Bonds”), the Republic shall concurrently or
in advance make a “Ratable Payment” (as defined below) to
NML.
b. Such “Ratable Payment” that the Republic is ORDERED
to make to NML shall be an amount equal to the “Payment
Percentage” (as defined below) multiplied by the total
amount currently due to NML in respect of the bonds at
issue in these cases (08 Civ. 6978, 09 Civ. 1707, and 09 Civ.
1708), including prejudgment interest (the “NML Bonds”).
c. Such “Payment Percentage” shall be the fraction calcu-
lated by dividing the amount actually paid or which the
Republic intends to pay under the terms of the Exchange
Bonds by the total amount then due under the terms of the
Exchange Bonds.173
In other words, the Second Circuit found that the district court’s
intention was ambiguous. Were the payments to be considered in
full satisfaction of the principal and interest? Further, would this
result in Argentina having to pay all of its obligations to the
holdout bondholders or would the holdout bondholders be paid in
proportion to the amount Argentina paid the settled bondholders?
On remand, the district court answered the Second Circuit’s ques-
tion. The district court simplified its ruling by giving a real life
example of how it intended the holdouts to be paid:
In December 2012, there are interest payments of approxi-
mately $3.14 billion due on the Exchange Bonds. Presuma-
172. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Rep. of Arg., 699 F.3d 246, 255 (2d Cir. 2012).
173. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Rep. of Arg., No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 2012 WL 5895786,
at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012), aff’d 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013).
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bly, Argentina intends to pay 100% of what is owed. There
are currently debts owed to plaintiffs by Argentina of
approximately $1.33 billion. It should be emphasized that
these are debts currently owed, not debts spaced out over
future periods of time. In order to comply with the terms of
the Injunctions, Argentina must pay plaintiffs 100% of that
$1.33 billion concurrently with or in advance of the pay-
ments on the Exchange Bonds.174
The district court reached this decision because it read the pari
passu clause almost literally.  According to the district court, if
Argentina paid any bondholders, it must have paid the holdouts
fully. The district court thought it was irrelevant that the debt
owed to the holdout bondholders and the settled bondholders were
fundamentally different. The court described its rationale by first
noting that it recognized that the holdout and the Exchange bond-
holders differed in the amount owed to them and the nature of the
underlying debt.175 The court ruled that these distinctions were
not sufficient to warrant a broad reading of the pari passu clause.
The central issue to the Court was “[t]hat the obligations under
the various debts are complied with to the same extent, rather
than having the obligations on one debt honored and the obliga-
tions on the other debt repudiated, as has occurred in the present
case.”176
The district court rejected the Second Circuit’s second hypo-
thetical which raised the question of whether Argentina should be
obligated to pay the holdouts the same percentage of the total debt
as the renegotiated bond holders. The district court saw no excuse
to spread out the payments to holdout bondholders. The court
noted that Argentina owed the accelerated principal and interest
and it “owes it now . . . moreover, and this is most important, to
apply the second hypothetical of the Court of Appeals and spread
payment to plaintiffs over a period of time, would be a far cry from
a proper remedy for the flagrant and intentional contract viola-
tions committed by Argentina.”177
The court was clearly signaling that its interpretation of the
pari passu clause was partially motivated by its desire to punish
174. Id. at 3.
175. The two debts are different in nature, because the Exchange bondholders are
owed interest payments, while the holdout bondholders are owed accelerated
principal and interest.
176. NML Capital, Ltd., 2012 WL 5895786, at *3.
177. Id. at 4.
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Argentina’s “flagrant and intentional contract violations.”178 By
punishing Argentina, however, the court was willing to treat
Argentinians as necessary collateral damage and, at the same
time, jeopardize the global sovereign bond market. Perhaps in the
future, Argentina, or any other similarly situated sovereign,
should buy the bonds at market price at the time it re-structures
its obligations. If this path is chosen, a sovereign will likely be
able to negotiate with those that are willing and buy the rest of
the bonds at a significant discount—much the same way NML did.
This course would avoid litigation against vulture funds, although
it may also spark a bidding war for the remaining bonds if it is
known that a sovereign needs to buy out the remaining bonds.
VII. CONCLUSION
Law and economics has its shortcomings. However, in a case
such as this, where the issue could be broadly framed as the mar-
ket price of the bonds rather than contractual interpretation,
courts should not wreak economic havoc on the markets by judi-
cial fiat.
178. Id.
